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Abstract. In the face of the discourse about the democratic deficit and declining public support for the
European Union (EU), institutionalist scholars have examined the roles of institutions in EU decision
making and in particular the implications of the empowered European Parliament.Almost in isolation from
this literature, prior research on public attitudes toward the EU has largely adopted utilitarian, identity
and informational accounts that focus on individual-level attributes. By combining the insights from the
institutional and behavioural literature, this article reports on a novel cross-national conjoint experiment
designed to investigate multidimensionality of public attitudes by taking into account the specific roles of
institutions and distinct stages inEUdecisionmaking.Analysing data from a large-scale experimental survey
in 13 EU member states, the findings demonstrate how and to what extent the institutional design of EU
decision making shapes public support. In particular, the study finds a general pattern of public consensus
about preferred institutional reform regarding powers of proposal, adoption and voting among European
citizens in different countries, but notable dissent about sanctioning powers. The results show that utilitarian
and partisan considerations matter primarily for the sanctioning dimension in which many respondents in
Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark and Sweden prefer national courts to the Court of Justice of the EU.
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Introduction
In the face of the recurrent criticism of democratic deficit in the European Union (EU),
scholars and practitioners alike have discussed institutional reforms of the EU (e.g.,Weiler
et al. 1995; Scharpf 1999; Moravcsik 2002; Follesdal & Hix 2006). Critics contend that
the institutional structure of EU decision making and, in particular, the weakness of the
European Parliament (EP) allows for only limited accountability and responsiveness to
the public, undermining the legitimacy of the EU. In response, successive treaty reforms
have increased the powers of the EP – the only EU institution directly elected by citizens.1
With a further transfer of policy competencies (Hooghe & Marks 2009) and the effective
application of majority voting rule in the Council (Tsebelis &Garrett 2001), the co-decision
procedure introduced a bicameral procedure, in which the EP has equal legislative veto
powers with the Council. The most recent Lisbon Treaty has extended the EP’s co-decision
powers to most areas of EU legislation. The EP was considered to increase responsiveness
and accountability, improve transparency and ameliorate the democratic deficit by balancing
representational asymmetry against executive dominance (Rittberger 2003, 2005; Follesdal
& Hix 2006). However, despite the empowerment of the EP, public support has declined in
the post-Maastricht period,manifested by decreasing turnout in EP elections and the rise of
Eurosceptic parties. In this study, we seek to address this puzzle by combining the insights
from the institutionalist literature on EU decision making and behavioural studies on public
attitudes toward the EU.While the link between institutional design and public support has
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been at the heart of the discourse on EU reform, little is known about whether and how the
institutional design of EU decision making influences public support.
According to the institutionalist literature, EU decision making comprises multiple
dimensions by granting specific powers to different EU institutions at distinct stages (e.g.,
Steunenberg 1994; Tsebelis 1994; Crombez 1996; Garrett & Tsebelis 1996; Pollack 2003;
Jupille 2004; Tsebelis & Garrett 2001). To implement the goal of European integration, the
Commission has monopoly power to initiate policy proposals, which need approval by the
Council to become EU law. To facilitate the completion of the internal market in the EU,
the governments increasingly made decisions by majority voting rule in the Council. In the
case that a member state fails to implement EU law, the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) has the power to settle disputes and, in certain cases, to impose penalties.
While institutional design has been expected to enhance the credibility of commitments by
reducing the possibilities for ex-post opportunism (Moravcsik 1998), institutionalist scholars
have argued that it is essential to take into account the specific powers of the different
EU institutions and their dynamic interactions to fully understand the implications of EU
decision making (Tsebelis & Garrett 2001). Institutionalist research has made significant
contributions to further understanding the multidimensionality of EU decision making by
exploring the specific power distribution amongEU institutions.However, this literature has
paid little attention to its implications for public support, downplaying the broader social
determinants of institutional choice in the EU.
On the other hand, behavioural research on public attitudes toward the EU rarely
investigates whether and how the specific design of EU decision making influences public
support. Instead, most studies largely adopt three main approaches to explaining public
support for the EU:utilitarian, identity and informational accounts.The utilitarian approach
posits that citizens are more likely to support the EU when they perceive net personal
or national benefit from the EU (Eichenberg & Dalton 1993; Anderson & Reichert 1995;
Gabel & Palmer 1995; Anderson & Kaltenthaler 1996; Gabel 1998), while the identity
approach highlights the importance of national attachment or identity in shaping support
(Carey 2002; Hooghe & Marks 2005; Risse 2010). Despite their different accounts for the
formation of EU attitudes, these studies have in common that they focus on relatively fixed,
pre-defined individual attributes (commonly measured by the level of skills and national
attachment).The third approach on informational accounts notes that European integration
is too complex and remote from the daily lives of most citizens for them to have sufficient
interest and awareness, and stresses that citizens rely on proxies or cues to overcome their
information shortfalls. In particular, studies show that citizens use the performance of their
national governments (Anderson 1998; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000; Kritzinger 2003; De Vries
2018) or the positions of the political parties they support (De Vries & Edwards 2009;
Helbling et al. 2010)2 as a heuristic in shaping their support for the EU. However, these
studies have still not directly investigated the critical link between the institutional design
of EU decision making and public support, which underlies the longstanding discussion of
democratic deficit and institutional reform in the EU.3
In this study, we investigate whether and how the institutional design of EU decision
making shapes public support by linking the institutional literature to behavioural studies
on EU attitudes. The multidimensionality of EU decision making involving different
institutions with specific powers at distinct stages (such as the existing institutional design
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that grants the proposal power to theCommission,approval and voting power to theCouncil
and the EP, and sanctioning power to the CJEU) makes it difficult to investigate public
attitudes toward this process and institutional reform with the conventional methods of
survey research. Most of the existing studies rely on standard survey questions measuring
either an abstract and broad concept of support for EU membership (e.g., Dalton &
Eichenberg 1998; Gabel 1998) or trust in individual EU institutions such as the CJEU
or the EP (e.g., Caldeira & Gibson 1995; Gibson & Caldeira 1998; Gabel 2003), without
taking into account their specific roles or interactions in the decision-making process,
and thus cannot explore the multidimensionality of public attitudes toward EU decision
making.4 To address this challenge, we design a novel conjoint experiment that closely
captures the EU decision-making process by taking into account its distinct stages and the
specific powers of EU institutions. Our study randomly displays alternative institutional
designs by simultaneously varying four distinct institutional attributes such as proposal,
adoption, voting and sanctioning power in EU decision making to evaluate individuals’
relative preferences across multiple dimensions of this process. We embed our experiment
in a large-scale online survey fielded in 13 EU member states (Austria, Czech Republic,
Denmark,France,Germany,Greece,Hungary, Ireland, Italy,Netherlands, Poland, Spain and
Sweden) that largely represent different characteristics of the current EU member states.
This design allows us to evaluate the relative effects of multiple institutional attributes on
public support and how these effects vary across different groups of citizens, countries and
different institutional configurations.
We find that specific institutional designs of EU decision making significantly shape
public support. Interestingly, there exists a notable consensus about a preferred institutional
reform among European citizens in different countries, except in one dimension, which
involves actions againstmember states that fail to implementEU law.Respondents across all
countries indeed prefer the existing bicameral procedure and the majority voting rule,while
they show broad opposition to the Commission’s exclusive proposal power. Thus, and to
some surprise, the empowerment of the EP does not always lead tomore public support, and
further enhancement of public support can be achieved only in the institutional dimension
involving proposal power. This finding varies neither across countries nor respondents’ key
characteristics such as their perceived benefits of the EU, national attachment, political
knowledge and party support.On the other hand,we find notable dissent over the dimension
of sanctioning power. In particular, respondents in Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark
and Sweden prefer national courts, while the other countries prefer the existing CJEU
as a sanctioning institution. Also, we find empirical evidence that this dissent over the
sanctioning institution is largely driven by respondents’ utilitarian assessments of the EU
benefits and political parties they support.
Compared to existing research on EU attitudes, our findings highlight the
multidimensionality of EU decision making and how public support varies across these
dimensions. We also find that citizens organise their attitudes toward EU decision making
in systematic and meaningful ways and this structure of citizens’ preferences has important
implications for the discourse on the democratic deficit and institutional reform of the EU.
Notably, our results reveal both the possibilities and the limits of institutional reform as a
solution to legitimacy concerns by specifying how and to what extent specific institutional
design can increase or decrease public support.
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Inwhat follows,we first introduce the overview of studies to understand theEUdecision-
making processwith a connection to its implications for public support.Next,we propose our
research design to address the limitations of existing literature and standard surveymethods.
We then report the results of our analysis and the concluding section summarises our main
findings and discusses their theoretical and practical implications.
Dimensions of EU decision making
European integration has been explained from competing perspectives, such as
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism (Moravcsik 1998; Sandholtz & Stone Sweet
1998). According to intergovernmentalism, the governments are the masters of the treaties
on European integration (Alter 1998). They pursue socioeconomic interests in interstate
bargains and delegate powers to EU institutions to enhance the credibility of their
commitments (Moravcsik 1993). In contrast, the supranational/neofunctionalist approach
posits that the EU institutions are the drivers of European integration, which attempt
to implement a federal ideology (Haas 1958) or centralised technocratic management
(Majone 1996). In addition to intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, institutionalist
scholars draw attention to the power distribution among EU institutions (Steunenberg
1994; Tsebelis 1994; Crombez 1996; Tsebelis & Garrett 2001). On closer inspection of
this power distribution, originally developed by Jean Monnet for the European Coal and
Steel Community among six member states, supranational EU institutions, such as the
Commission with exclusive proposal power and the CJEU with sanctioning power, have
attempted to avoid intergovernmental competition and conflict in EU decision making to
enhance European integration.On the contrary, the Council has been considered to provide
for intergovernmental responsiveness, while the EP has gained more legislative powers
in EU decision making due to the effective application of the majority voting rule in the
Council and a further transfer of policy competences from the national to the supranational
level of the EU in the post-Maastricht period (König 2018).Accordingly, we expect that the
institutional design of EU decision making has significant implications for the way citizens
perceive and evaluate the EU.
Proposal
We incorporate the institutional framework that characterises multiple EU institutions
playing different roles at distinct stages to distinguish four main dimensions of EU decision
making: proposal, adoption, voting rules and sanctioning. First, for any decision to be made,
an issue must be placed on the agenda. Agenda-setting concerns the strategic choice or
selection of policy alternatives from a set of all possible outcomes on which individual
or collective actors finally decide. Thus, agenda-setting power has been understood as a
means to manipulate the decision-making process and collective outcomes (e.g., McKelvey
1976; Romer & Rosenthal 1978; Shepsle & Weingast 1984; Ordeshook & Schwartz 1987).
In parliamentary democracies, the right to draft a proposal is usually shared between
government and parliament, often with a required threshold of parliamentary support to
submit a policy proposal to the legislature. In addition, the right to propose policy can
also be provided to a second chamber, or in some cases to popular initiatives. Sharing the
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right to propose policy may promote responsiveness to the public by creating competitive
agenda-setting, in which different actors can submit alternative proposals to the legislature.
Independent from the success of proposals, competitive agenda-setting may overcome
policy gatekeeping (Crombez et al. 2006) and generate position-taking benefits by signaling
responsiveness to public concerns (Mayhew 1974; Bevan & Jennings 2014).
In contrast, in the EU, the Commission with the responsibility to promote European
integration has the exclusive right to initiate so-called ‘secondary legislation’, and scholars
have debated over how different institutional reforms influence this role and procedural
interactions with other institutions.5 According to Pollack (1997), the member states have
delegated this agenda-settingmonopoly to the Commission to ensure high-quality proposals
while avoiding intergovernmental competition and biases in agenda-setting. With the
introduction of the co-decision procedure in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty and its revision
by the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty, Commission proposals require bicameral approval by a
(qualified) majority in the Council and the EP.Under the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, this bicameral
procedure has become the standard procedure.Although the additional parliamentary veto
may decrease the agenda-setting power of the Commission in secondary legislation, it may
also increase the discretion of the European Commission in tertiary legislation (Junge et al.
2015) and the CJEU in preliminary rulings (Larsson & Naurin 2016). As a supranational
organ that is committed to a pro-integrationist agenda, the Commission’s proposal power
may introduce a pro-integrationist bias (Steunenberg 1994; Crombez 1996; Schmidt 2000;
Tsebelis & Garrett 2000).6
The Commission’s monopoly of agenda-setting power has come under scrutiny for two
reasons. First, with the accession of new member states, the heterogeneity of interests has
increased. While the monopoly of the Commission has been introduced to pursue the goal
of European integration for the six founding member states, the EU currently consists of
28 member states, covering the heterogeneous interests of Western, Northern, Southern
and Eastern regions of Europe. Second, with a further transfer of policy competences from
the national to the EU level, the interests in the EU have become more diverse, covering
not only the areas of agriculture and economic integration, but also internal and external
affairs, environment, energy, competition, monetary and immigration policies. This higher
heterogeneity and diversity in preferences have raised a question of whether the existing
agenda-setting monopoly is effective and sustainable.We expect that public opinion would
reflect this tension between Commissionmonopoly andmore competitivemodes of agenda-
setting.Accordingly,we focus on towhat extent thismonopoly tomake proposals should stay
with the Commission, or should be shared with, or even exclusively assigned to, the member
states in the Council and/or the EP.
Adoption
The procedures for EU decision making were transformed from unicameral to bicameral
approval in the post-Maastricht period. According to the literature on bicameralism, the
existence of a second chamber alone affects policy outcomes, no matter how power between
the chambers is distributed (Tsebelis & Money 1997: 11). For Tsebelis and Garrett (2001:
372), the endowment of the EP with veto power is ‘a key institutional development in the
modern history of European integration’. The normative motivation for strengthening the
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EP was to address the criticism of the EU’s democratic deficit, which results from executive
dominance (Andersen & Burns 1996; Raunio 1999), weak parliamentary control (Williams
1991; Lodge 1994; Crombez 2003), little electoral party competition (Hix 1999; Marks et al.
2002), the complex decision-making processes that are difficult to understand (Wallace &
Smith 1995) and policy drift from voter preferences (Streeck & Schmitter 1991; Scharpf
1999). In response, in 1993, the Maastricht Treaty introduced the co-decision procedure.7
Later, the Lisbon Treaty established the co-decision procedure as the ordinary legislative
procedure and extended its application to almost all policy areas.
Despite many existing studies examining the implications of the co-decision procedure
(Garrett 1995; Crombez 2000; Tsebelis & Garrett 2000; Tsebelis 2002; Napel & Widgren
2003), there is an almost universal consensus among scholars that the EP has increasingly
gained power in EU decision making. Studies find that the empowerment of the EP
decreases the legislative decision-making efficiency (Schulz & König 2000; Golub &
Steunenberg 2007) and effectiveness (Crombez & Hix 2015). Also, the veto role of the
EP increases the risk of gridlock in the bicameral legislature, which may increase the
discretionary power of the Commission and the CJEU (e.g., Hammond & Miller 1987;
Tsebelis & Garrett 2001; Junge et al. 2015). This suggests that empowering the EP may
fail to achieve the normative goals it has been justified with and hamper the efficiency and
effectiveness of the decision-making process,which might dampen public support.Hence, in
our empirical design, to evaluate the effects of alternative institutional attributes concerning
adoption, we distinguish between the bicameral status quo from unicameral alternatives,
favouring either the Council or the EP.We also include adoption of policy proposals by the
Commission, which is the case already in tertiary legislation (Junge et al. 2015).
Voting
Scholars have investigated the implications of different voting rules for member states and
institutional power distribution in EU decision making (Brams & Affuso 1985; Hosli 1995;
König & Bräuninger 1998; Barr & Passarelli 2009). Under the unanimity rule, all member
states are equally powerful and can secure intergovernmental responsiveness, as a negative
vote from any of the member states will prevent legislation from being adopted. Under
qualifiedmajority voting (QMV),however, largermember states aremore likely to influence
outcomes than smaller ones. Ever since the 1986 Single European Act, the Council has
increasingly made decisions under QMV rather than under unanimity voting. As a result,
the effective removal of national vetoes in the Council rendered the Commission the prime
mover behind European integration (Tsebelis & Garrett 2001). With the accession of new
member states, QMV thresholds were re-defined several times, and the current rules were
introduced in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, with QMV requiring a 65 per cent share of the EU’s
population and a 55 per cent share of the member states.
The member states have been acutely aware of how their voting weights and the QMV
threshold will affect their relative power (Hix&Høyland 2013).While larger member states
profit from an allocation of voting rights proportional to population size, smaller member
states advocate a procedure that further secures their influence (Raunio & Wiberg 1998).
Studies on EU decision making also emphasise that the relative location of preferences
determines the risk of being outvoted under (qualified) majority voting (Thomson et al.
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2006). This suggests that preferences over the voting rule are informed by expectations over
whether they help realise an actor’s policy preferences. König and Bräuninger (1998) make
clear the tradeoffs: on the one hand, lowering the voting threshold makes policy change
more likely; on the other, it also increases the risks that one’s own preferences are being
excluded. These risks are relatively negligible for members with centrist positions that are
closer to the bargaining outcomes (Arregui & Thomson 2009).
Given this tradeoff, our analysis focuses on the distinction between unanimity
and majority voting. The literature suggests that unanimity voting could be preferred
in particular by respondents from smaller member states with more extreme policy
preferences, who would perceive a greater risk of their concerns being excluded under
majority voting rules.
Sanctioning
Finally, the CJEU is responsible for the interpretation and application of the treaties andEU
law that implement the goal of European integration. The court rules on whether members
have failed to fulfill obligations set out in the treaties and EU law; considers the legality of
acts of the Commission, Council or EP; and interprets the meaning of the treaties and EU
law in preliminary rulings. The literature attributes a critical role to the CJEU in ensuring
the credibility of the commitments which member states agreed upon in treaties and EU
law (Carrubba & Gabel 2014). The court serves as a fire alarm by detecting and signaling
possible violations of agreements,and as an information clearing house by providing a venue
in which the facts of the case can be investigated (Carrubba 2009; Carrubba &Gabel 2014).
In this view, the CJEU performs adjudicating and sanctioning functions that are vital to the
acquis communautaire.
Scholars have explored the role of the CJEU and the political implications of the court’s
judgments. Similar to other courts, there is an ongoing debate as to what extent the judges
of the CJEU follow political preferences rather than purely legal considerations to promote
European integration (e.g., Burley & Mattli 1993; Weiler 1994; Alter 1998; Stone Sweet &
Brunell 2012).Scholarship on the separation of powers has investigated extensively whether
the CJEU can make decisions independently from national governments in the face of the
threats of override and noncompliance (e.g.,Garrett et al. 1998;Pollack 2003;Carrubba et al.
2008; Stone Sweet & Brunell 2012; Larsson & Naurin 2016).
In particular, recent studies pay attention to the role of the public who can act as an
indirect enforcement mechanism for the court at both national (Stephenson 2004; Vanberg
2005; Staton 2006; Carrubba & Zorn 2010) and international levels (Mansfield et al. 2002;
Carrubba 2009; Chaudoin 2014; Fjelstul & Carrubba 2018). Facing enforcement problems,
the likelihood of government compliancewith adverse rulings depends on the public support
and legitimacy the court enjoys (Vanberg 2005; Carrubba 2009). Accordingly, whether
the current CJEU enjoys public support is an important empirical question, which has
implications for successful enforcement action and the overall EU decision-making process.
Our analysis distinguishes the status quo that grants the CJEU sanctioning powers from
two alternatives: national courts, and a solution moderated by representatives of the EU
and affected member states. It has been more than two decades since Caldeira and Gibson
(1995; see also Gibson &Caldeira 1998) found that the CJEU enjoys lower levels of support
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than many national courts based on the analysis of cross-national surveys in 1992 and
1993. We juxtapose alternative options for adjudication and sanctioning together with the
other institutional attributes at different stages and make an empirical assessment of public
support for EU decision making.
Research design
Conjoint experiment analysis
Based on a large-scale sample in 13 EU member states, we design and conduct a novel
cross-national conjoint experiment to evaluate the multidimensionality of public attitudes
toward EU decision making. Compared to standard experimental designs, conjoint analysis
enables us to estimate the causal effects ofmultiple treatment components and assess several
hypotheses simultaneously (Hainmueller et al. 2014). Our conjoint experiment varies
different institutional attributes simultaneously to evaluate individuals’ relative preferences
across multiple dimensions of EU decision making. This experimental design is particularly
useful for our study on public support as it allows us to compare the relative impact of
different institutional dimensions on attitudes toward the EU.Moreover, validation studies
have shown that conjoint experiments perform remarkably well in predicting real-world
behaviour, maximising the external validity of our findings (Hainmueller et al. 2015).
Relating to the literature on EU decision making, we distinguish between four main
dimensions: proposal, adoption, voting rule and sanctioning. Following a short background
introduction and the instruction about the conjoint task, we show respondents a screen
with profiles of two institutional designs of EU decision making, as displayed in Figure 1.
Table 1 provides a list of all institutional dimensions and their potential values.8 We ask
each respondent to evaluate four comparisons between two institutional design profiles. In
each comparison, we use two questions to measure multidimensional preferences toward
institutional designs. The first question asks respondents to report a preference for one of
the two profiles. This question has the advantage that it forces respondents to focus on the
attributes that make them support institutional designs (Hainmueller et al. 2014). As an
alternativemeasure for a robustness check,we also ask respondents to rate each institutional
profile on a five-point scale.We use these ratings to code a binary variable as 1 if the rating
is above the midpoint and 0 otherwise.9
The survey experiment was fielded in 13 EU member states from December 2017
to March 2018. We recruited 13,000 respondents (about 1,100 respondents per country)
from 13 EU member states that largely represent different characteristics of the current
28 member states using Survey Sampling International (SSI) (see Figure A3 in the Online
Appendix). The sample includes Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Sweden. SSI recruits
panel members through various opt-in methods (including website banners, television
advertisements, e-mails, apps, social media and websites) and employs a probability-
weighted random process to select panel members. For our study, quotas were established
based on respondent age and gender to ensure that the sample was representative of each
country. The sampling algorithm continued to recruit SSI participants until all quotas were
reached.
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Figure 1. Experimental design. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
This sample design is important to serve our goal of obtaining a more comprehensive
evaluation of individuals’multidimensional attitudes towardEUdecisionmaking and public
support for institutional reform in the EU.We are interested in estimating treatment effects
that may differ due to a broad range of individual-level factors for which non-probability
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Table 1. Dimensions of conjoint experiment
Dimension Features
Proposal The European Commission
Who should propose legislation? The member states represented in the
Council
The European Commission, European
Parliament or the Council
The European Parliament
Adoption The member states represented in the Council
and the European Parliament




Voting Member states decide with majority vote
How should they vote on proposals? Member states decide unanimously
Sanctions Court of Justice of the European Union
Who should decide on violations? National courts
Representatives of EU and affected member
states
samples may be less representative.As an additional robustness check,we also re-estimated
our models by using entropy balancing (Hainmueller 2012) to reweight our sample tomatch
the demographic margins from the population (see Figure A4 in the Online Appendix).
Our research design and data allow us to examine how specific attributes of EU decision
making generate public support or opposition, and how public preferences over institutional
reform vary across different EU member states. Moreover, our experiment enables us to
assess our central argument, juxtaposed with existing explanations that emphasise different
individual-level attributes. To this purpose, we also include a series of questions to measure
the respondents’ utility calculations, national attachment, information and other factors to
evaluate plausible mechanisms to explain our findings.
Results
To explore the structure of public support for institutional reform,we first examine whether
and how specific features of EU decision making shape public attitudes. To answer this
question, we follow the approach proposed by Hainmueller et al. (2014) and estimate the
averagemarginal component effects (AMCEs) of the decision-making attributes,using their
regression-based estimator. The AMCE expresses the average effect of an institutional
attribute on the probability that an individual supports the institutional design, where the
average is computed on the basis of all the other attributes. We estimate the AMCEs by
regressing the binary choice variable on indicator variables for the levels of the attributes.
For all estimations, we calculate clustered standard errors by respondents because they
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Figure 2. Effects of institutional attributes on the probability to prefer an institutional design.
Notes: Pooled analysis. J = 15373; N = 122,984. The figure illustrates estimates of the effects of the
randomly assigned institutional attributes on the probability of being preferred. The bars capture 95 per
cent confidence intervals. The points without horizontal bars refer to reference categories.
participate in four conjoint comparisons. When we assume that there are no carryover,
profile-order, or randomisation effects, the AMCE can be nonparametrically identified.
The Online Appendix includes additional material on the robustness and validity tests. We
also analyse the data using an alternative specification of the dependent variable and we
implement diagnostic tests to check the main assumptions of our analysis (see the Online
Appendix).
The effects of the institutional designs on the probability of public support, pooling
across all respondents, are plotted in Figure 2. The AMCE estimates are the dots and the
lines show the confidence intervals. The experiment considers the dimensions of proposal,
adoption, voting and sanctioning.Note that the estimates for each institutional attribute are
calculated relative to a reference value.Capturing the status quo in EU decision making, the
reference category for the dimension of proposal is ‘the Commission’, and for the dimension
of adoption the reference is ‘the Council and the European Parliament’. The estimates on
different voting rules use ‘majority voting’ as a reference category and the estimates on
sanctions take the ‘Court of Justice’ as a reference.
The results demonstrate that specific institutional designs of EU decision making
significantly shape public support. European citizens oppose the Commission’s exclusive
proposal power, while they prefer the existing bicameral procedure and majority voting.
Interestingly, different from common expectations, the empowerment of the EP does not
always increase public support. On the other hand, we find that European citizens’ support
for the existing CJEU is higher than that for national courts as an alternative reform option.
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Figure 3. Expected public support for an alternative institutional design.
Notes: The figure illustrates estimates of public support for alternative institutional designs. The bars
capture 95 per cent confidence intervals. Note that the baseline probability of choosing a randomly drawn
institutional profile is 0.5 as we force the respondent to choose one of the two profiles.
Further enhancement of public support can be made only in the institutional dimension
involving proposal power. These results also hold for the alternative rating measure.10
In our rating measure, respondents can support both proposals, oppose both or
support/oppose only one or the other. Thus, this collection of ratings allows us to specify
the extent to which institutional designs shape public support.We differentiate respondents
who vary their support as a function of the specific institutional design from those
who categorically reject or accept all proposals that they are asked about, regardless of
the attributes of the proposals. We find that only about 2 per cent of the respondents
categorically oppose all eight institutional designs presented to them, and about 8 per cent
of the respondents categorically support all institutional proposals. In contrast, about 90 per
cent of the respondents vary their support as a function of the specific institutional designs.
To represent the substantive implications of our results for institutional reform, we plot
the expected public support for four different institutional designs in Figure 3. As we force
the respondent to choose one of the two institutional designs, the baseline probability of
choosing a randomly drawn institutional proposal is 0.5 where the expected public support
for the third (from the top) institutional design (proposal: Commission, Parliament or
Council; adoption: Parliament; voting rule: unanimity vote; sanctioning: national courts)
is located. The first institutional reform proposal (proposal: Commission, Parliament or
Council; adoption: Council and Parliament; voting rule: majority vote; sanctioning: CJEU)
located at the top captures an institutional design that wins the highest support of 66 per cent
of the respondents, while the fourth institutional reform proposal at the bottom reflects the
institutional design that wins the lowest support of 32 per cent.Another institutional design
that captures the existing structure of EUdecisionmaking (proposal:Commission;adoption:
Council and Parliament; voting rule: majority vote; sanctioning: CJEU) wins support of
54 per cent of the respondents. Together, while our results suggest that specific institutional
design can have a critical effect on public support, they also highlight the upper bound of
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Figure 4. Effects of institutional attributes across country.
Notes: The figure illustrates estimates of the effects of the randomly assigned institutional attributes on
the probability of being preferred. The bars capture 95 per cent confidence intervals. The points without
horizontal bars refer to reference categories.
public support that institutional reform can generate. Indeed, there exists no institutional
reform that can garner more than public support of 66 per cent.
Country-specific results
From a comparative perspective, our analysis allows us to examine country-specific
evaluations of institutional designs, which may be hidden in our pooled analysis. In
particular, we further examine whether the reform preferences follow a similar pattern
across the 13 EUmember states. The 13 surveyed countries vary significantly with regard to
several potentially relevant factors for structuring public preferences over the EU decision-
making process, such as the size of the population, their economic strength, government
position on the EU, and other political and social conditions that influence their positions in
theEU.Despite these differences, the institutional preferences show a similar pattern,except
in one dimension, which involves actions against member states that fail to implement EU
law. In Figure 4, to facilitate an overview,we group our country-specific findings into four EU
regions: Northern Eurozone, Northern non-Eurozone, Eastern and Southern countries.11
Figure 4 shows that there exists a notable consensus amongEuropean citizens in different
countries on which institutional reform is preferred, regarding the three dimensions:
proposal, adoption and voting rules. It is notable that respondents across all countries
show broad opposition to the Commission’s exclusive proposal power, while they prefer
the existing bicameral procedure and majority voting. In contrast, we find that there exists
dissent over the sanctioning dimension among respondents in different EU member states.
Specifically, respondents in Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark and Sweden prefer
national courts, while the other countries prefer the existing CJEU. This dissent suggests
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Figure 5. Expected public support for the existing institutional design by country.
that the dimension of sanctioning can be the potentially most contentious issue of debate
over institutional reform, which needs to be ratified in all member states.
To better understand the structure of public support, we specify and compare aggregate
levels of public support for the existing EU decision-making process and respondents’ most
preferred institutional designs in the 13 surveyed countries. Figure 5 shows that there is
country-specific variation in the level of support while respondents in the majority of the
surveyed member states are relatively supportive of the institutional design that is the most
similar to the current EU decision-making process (proposal: the Commission adoption:
Council and Parliament; voting rule: majority vote; sanctioning: CJEU), given that the
highest level of public support that can be achieved through institutional reform is 66 per
cent (refer to Figure 2). The respondents in the Netherlands show the highest level of public
support for the existing institutional design followed by Spain andGermany,while theCzech
Republic shows the lowest, followed by Sweden and Austria.
Moreover, we identify the institutional designs that are the most preferred by
respondents in 13 countries. Table 2 reveals that there are two distinct institutional
designs that the respondents in the surveyed countries support the most. Interestingly,
respondents’ preferences for institutional reform are grouped into two distinct types, which
feature alternative approaches to EU decision making in the dimensions of proposal and
sanctioning. As in the previous analysis, we find broad support for the existing bicameral
procedure and majority voting in both groups. Both groups also oppose the Commission’s
existing proposal monopoly, but with different reform alternatives. However, the difference
in two groups’ preferences for competitive agenda-setting (by the Commission, the Council
or the EP) over the Council’s exclusive agenda-setting is not statistically significant. In
contrast to these dimensions, we find a notable dissent about the sanctioning dimension
among respondents in different EU member states. Specifically, respondents in Austria,
the Czech Republic, Denmark and Sweden prefer national courts, while those in the other
countries prefer the CJEU. Moreover, this difference in preferences for the CJEU over
national courts is substantively large and statistically significant (see the Online Appendix).
Do the effects of the institutional attributes vary depending on the other dimensions
of EU decision making? For example, we might expect that respondents’ preferences for
a certain attribute in the adoption dimension can depend on the institutional attribute in
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Table 2. Most preferred institutional designs by country
Proposal: Commission, Parliament or Council Council
Adoption: Council and Parliament Council and Parliament
Voting: Members states decide with majority vote Member states decide with majority vote










the proposal dimension. However, we find no substantively meaningful interactions among
different combinations of the institutional attributes, regardless of the alternative methods
of analysing the possible interactions (see the Online Appendix). The lack of interaction
suggests that our findings hold across alternative designs of the EUdecision-making process.
Interactions with respondent characteristics
Our empirical design allows us to assess the robustness of our main findings and examine
possible interactions between institutional attributes and respondents’ characteristics. In
particular, most of the existing studies on EU attitudes have stressed the importance of
key individual-level attributes such as individuals’ utilitarian evaluations of the EU benefits,
national attachment,political knowledge and the position of the parties they support, among
others, in explaining attitudes toward the EU.
To examine the impact of key individual-level attributes toward EU decision making,we
follow the suggestions of Hainmueller et al. (2014; see also Hainmueller & Hopkins 2015).
Specifically, we split the sample and estimate the average of the institutional attribute’s
marginal effect conditional on the respondent characteristic of interest, which is called
the ‘conditional AMCE’.12 This approach enables us to compare the effects of different
institutional characteristics across subsets, as shown in Figure 6.
Overall, we find that the effects of the institutional attributes are broadly similar across
the different subgroups, except in one dimension: sanctioning. It is clear from the current
analysis that most of our major findings, particularly regarding how a proposal is made,
adopted and voted on, stay the same, regardless of whether respondents perceive more
benefits from the EU or not, whether they have national attachment or not, and whether
they have sufficient knowledge about the EU or not.13 If anything, the positive effect of
institutional reform in the direction of intergovernmentalism (such as the empowerment
of the Council in the proposal dimension), or the negative effect of the reform toward
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Figure 6. Effects of institutional attributes on the probability to prefer an institutional design across
subgroups of respondents.
Notes: The figure illustrates estimates of the effects of the randomly assigned institutional attributes on
the probability of being preferred. The bars capture 95 per cent confidence intervals. The points without
horizontal bars refer to reference categories.
supranationalism in the adoption dimension is relatively stronger among those who perceive
fewer benefits from the EU and who support anti-EU parties. Similarly, the negative
effect of institutional reform in the direction of intergovernmentalism in the voting rule
is much stronger among those who perceive more benefits from the EU and who support
pro-EU parties. With respect to these three dimensions (proposal, adoption and voting
rule), national attachment and knowledge about the EU play a relatively limited role
in moderating the effects of institutional attributes. However, despite these meaningful
implications of intergovernmental and supranational features for public support, the
institutional preferences follow a similar pattern across key subgroups and different EU
countries.14 In particular,given that people are unlikely to possess detailed knowledge of EU
institutions and how they work, it is notable to find that there exists a striking consistency
across different member states and key individual-level characteristics that account for
public attitudes towardEUdecisionmaking.Our results confirm that public attitudes toward
EU decision making are structured in a systematic way.
However, there is an important exception to this effect homogeneity: Figure 6 shows
that respondents who do not perceive personal benefits of the EU and support Eurosceptic
parties are more likely to prefer national courts than the CJEU. Indeed, national courts
are the least preferred option for respondents who perceive positive benefits from the EU
and who support pro-EU parties, while they are the most preferred option for those who
do not perceive these benefits and those who support Eurosceptic parties. The effect of the
sanctioning institution on public support significantly changes as a function of respondents’
utility calculations and party support. Such economic and political considerations may also
help us to understand the country-specific variation where Austria, the Czech Republic,
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Denmark and Sweden, in contrast to the other member states, prefer the approach that
grants sanctioning power to national courts.
Concluding remarks
In this study,we evaluate specific institutional designs that determine public attitudes toward
EU decision making. In the post-Maastricht period, there have been ongoing discussions of
institutional reforms that can address declining public support and the democratic deficit
of EU decision making. Most reform proposals include, for example, the empowerment of
the EP that can provide an ‘electoral connection’ in European integration (Carrubba 2001;
Follesdal & Hix 2006). Nevertheless, studies of public attitudes toward the EU have mostly
focused on individual-level factors such as citizens’ utilitarian assessment of theEU,national
attachment, political knowledge and their party support.
Based on a large-scale cross-national survey in 13 EU member states, we combined
insights from the institutional literature on EU decision making and behavioural studies
on EU attitudes. We evaluated whether and how the specific design of EU decision
making shapes public support. For this purpose,we designed a novel cross-national conjoint
experiment to estimate the multidimensionality of public attitudes by taking into account
the specific roles of the institutions at distinct stages of EU decision making. We find that
the specific design of decisionmaking significantly shapes public support. Interestingly, there
exists a notable consensus about preferred institutional reform among European citizens in
different countries, except in one dimension, which involves actions against member states
that violate or fail to implement EU law.
Respondents across all surveyed countries indeed prefer the existing bicameral
procedure and majority voting in EU decision making, while they show broad opposition
to the Commission’s exclusive proposal power. This finding varies neither across countries
nor respondents’ key characteristics such as their perceived benefits of the EU, national
attachment, political knowledge and party support. In contrast, we find notable dissent
over the dimension of sanctioning power, which may impede the success of institutional
reform. In particular, respondents in Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark and Sweden
prefer national courts, while those from other countries prefer the existing CJEU as a
sanctioning institution. On closer inspection, this dissent over the sanctioning institution
is largely driven by respondents’ utilitarian assessments of their EU benefits and political
parties they support. In contrast, individuals’ level of knowledge about the EU and national
attachment are only weakly associated with their stance on institutional reform. To further
check the robustness of our findings, we conducted a series of additional analyses and
validity tests using an alternative specification of the dependent variable and diagnostic tests
to check the main assumptions of our analysis.
Our results highlight the underlying nature of public support for EU decision making
and institutional reform. Until now, the literatures on EU institutions and public attitudes
have been developed in isolation from each other.The institutionalist literature has outlined
the multidimensionality of EU decision making and the effects of the power distribution on
outcomes, without carefully considering their implications for public support. Behavioural
research has largely adopted utilitarian, identity and informational accounts that focus on
relatively fixed, pre-defined individual attributes to explain public attitudes toward the EU,
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often measured by either abstract/broad support for EU membership or trust in individual
EU institutions.Our analysis investigated themultidimensionality of public attitudes toward
EU decision making by taking into account the specific powers of EU institutions and the
distinct dimensional stages in the decision-making process.15 Given the multidimensionality
of EU decision making, our findings suggest that the aggregate level of public support for
institutional reform would vary depending on the specific design and the reform dimension
which prevails in the dynamic process of public debate. Some reform dimensions, such
as the distribution of proposal power, adoption and voting rules generate a relatively
large consensus, while in particular, the dimension of sanctioning power may raise public
controversies. This finding may also provide insights into the discussion of institutional
reform in the EU by specifying the extent to which institutional reform can shape public
support.
The findings of this study have important implications that contribute to the broader
literature in political science. Democratic institutions require broader public support to
be politically sustainable and effective. While most often used in the context of the EU,
the issue of democratic deficit and democratic legitimacy has been increasingly contested
in both domestic and international institutions. Evaluations of democratic deficit focus
on the procedural aspects of democracy, reflected in the mechanisms of decision making,
and institutional reforms have been proposed as a popular solution. With respect to
the central question of whether and to what extent institutional design affects public
support and eventually legitimacy,16 our study first shows that the public’s institutional
preferences are stable and well-structured, in contrast to the traditional and pessimistic
view of public opinion. If public attitudes are random or unstructured, or if they are
simply a reflection of positions of political parties or the media, the public’s ability
to constrain policy makers would be limited.17 Moreover, we find that public support
systematically varies according to the specific design of decision making and institutional
features. Researchers have made significant progress over the past years in exploring how
well-known institutional features affect citizens’ attitudes and behaviour. However, most
of the existing studies are limited to either estimating the composite effects of broad
institutional arrangements, or the effects of individual institutions that are often confounded
with other correlated components. Our study incorporates the institutional framework
that characterises the multidimensionality of the decision-making process, which involves
the interactions of multiple actors with different roles at distinct stages. In particular, we
believe that conjoint analysis is particularly useful for decomposing the composite effects of
various institutional arrangements.We demonstrated how conjoint experiments can identify
various component-specific causal effects by randomly manipulating multiple attributes
of institutional alternatives simultaneously. Future research may extend this method to
advance our understanding of the multidimensional nature of democratic institutions and
processes and the dynamic interactions of institutional context and political behaviour.
Online Appendix
Additional supporting information may be found in the Online Appendix section at the end
of the article:
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Table A1: Descriptive information on variables
Table A2: Response patterns
Figure A1: Computing Average Component Interaction Effects (ACIEs) for first-order
interaction effects among the four dimension.
Figure A2: Subgroup-specific difference in conditional AMCEs.
Table A3: Official demographic statistics from Eurostat (2018), compared to the sample
distribution
Figure A3: Country representativeness by dimension.
Figure A4: Before and after entropy balancing.
Figure A5: AMCEs estimated separately for two cases: whether a profile is shown first (on
the left) or second (on the right).
Figure A6: Analysis split by successive rounds.
Table A4: Balance tests using (multinomial) logit models to regress shown attributes on
respondent characteristics
Figure A7: By consistency of answer patterns.
Figure A8: By reading check.
Figure A9: By response speed.
Figure A10: Alternative dependent variable I: Binary coding of rating scale.
Figure A11: Alternative dependent variable II: Ordinal coding of rating scale.
Notes
1. In addition to a series of treaty reforms,European Court of Justice rulings and the evolution of the EP’s
ownRules of Procedure have been two complementary elements to this empowerment (Hix &Høyland
2013).
2. Most mainstream parties have preferred not to politicise an issue that could lead to internal splits and
voter defection. As a consequence, Eurosceptic positions have mainly been adopted by parties on the
fringes of the left-right spectrum that mobilise Euroscepticism to attract voters (Taggart 1998; Hooghe
et al. 2002; De Vries & Edwards 2009; Van de Wardt et al. 2014; Hobolt & De Vries 2015; Van Elsas &
Van der Brug 2015).
3. It is noteworthy that Rohrschneider (2002) and Karp et al. (2003) highlight the importance of
evaluations of EU institutions in explaining EU support, while these studies still focus on the overall
confidence in EU institutions,without taking into account their specific powers and distinct stages in the
EU decision-making process.
4. A conventional survey question asks respondents: ‘Generally speaking do you think (your country’s)
membership in the Union is a good thing, a bad thing or neither good or bad?’
5. The formal allocation of powers in EU decision making differs from how institutions actually work.
Although the EP and the Council may ask the Commission to initiate a proposal, the Commissionmakes
the final decision. Informally, this promotes strategic considerations, where the EP and the Council may
only ask about proposals, which the Commission is likely to introduce.Our study provides new leverage
to disentangle the effects of correlated institutional attributes.
6. With a further lowering of the voting threshold in the Council and the empowerment of the EP, scholars
have debated on the extent to which the Commission’s agenda-setting power has changed (Pollack 1997;
Crombez 2000; Tsebelis & Garrett 2000; Tallberg 2003).
7. The 1999 Amsterdam Treaty extended the areas where the co-decision procedure applies and provided
for the adoption of legislation at first reading (if the EP and Council agree at this stage).
8. For each profile, we employ a completely independent randomisation and the values of each dimension
that characterises the two profiles randomly vary both within and across the comparisons. The features
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and content of institutional designs we present to the respondents are designed not only to capture
previous discussions of EU institutional reform, but also to be generalisable to other contexts. We
made sure that major dimensions and different attributes of each dimension closely reflect the main
alternatives publicly discussed.
9. Alternatively, we also employ a scaled version of the rating outcome, where the original 1–5 coding is
rescaled to vary between 0 and 1, following Bechtel and Scheve (2013). The analysis results remain the
same.
10. In addition to general concerns about the data quality of online surveys, as the informational account
of EU attitudes suggests, people are unlikely to possess detailed knowledge of EU institutions and
how they work. To address these issues, we (1) measured the respondent’s political sophistication and
political knowledge in different ways (e.g., level of education and objective/subjective measures of the
respondent’s political knowledge about the EU and its decision making procedure), (2) set up different
quality control questions (filtering questions to capture the respondent’s attention and consistency of
the responses and speeder check) and (3) utilised alternative choice designs (e.g., designs with forced
choice and rating questions) that require different levels of engagement with the task.Then,we evaluate
whether our results vary across these different robustness checks. Overall, across a series of additional
analyses and robustness checks, we found strikingly consistent results. Our results confirm that public
attitudes toward EU decision making are structured in a systematic way. See Figure 6 and related
discussion of our subgroup analyses below and Figures A2 and A7-11 in the Online Appendix.
11. Additionally, we also employ two other models to address the potentially important roles of country-
level factors in influencing our main results. First, we utilise a fixed effects model to address all potential
unobserved confounding variables at the country level from the analysis.Second,we also use amultilevel
model to take into accountmultiple key contextual-level factors such as the size of population,economic
conditions and the government position on the EU. Our main results remain robust. These additional
analysis results are available from the authors upon request.
12. These results based on split sample tests are suggestive rather than definitive. One fundamental
limitation of the standard approach that utilises subgroup analysis is that it brings an observational
component into an otherwise experimental design (Acharya et al. 2018). Since the sample is split
into subgroups based on respondent-level properties that are observed rather than randomly assigned,
unobserved confounders may present a problem to causal inference. We therefore must acknowledge
limitations of our approach in evaluating the existing competing accounts of EU attitudes.However, our
estimates of conditional AMCEs enable us to compare the pattern of treatment effects in the context
of the previous literature.
13. As pointed out in Note 8 above, we conduct a series of robustness checks considering the respondent’s
political knowledge about the EU and its procedures, political sophistication and engagement with the
task.
14. Leeper et al. (2019) note that the difference in conditional AMCEs across subgroups should not be
used to describe a difference in underlying subgroup preferences as interactions are sensitive to the
reference category used in regression analysis. However, we use the existing institutional arrangements
as reference categories and interpret between-subgroup differences in conditional AMCEs relative
to this institutional status quo. Thus, we can make inferences about preferences for institutional
reform (the degree to which the given institutional attribute influences respondents’ support for the
packaged institutional design relative to the existing institutional arrangements, averaging across all
other institutional features).
15. Our study focuses on the EU decision-making process, which concerns its legislative procedure. A
further investigation of public preferences toward the EU decision-making process with a connection to
other EU reforms is beyond the scope of our study.Also, while we highlight surprising public consensus
on the three main institutional dimensions and notable dissent about the sanctioning dimension and
perform various robustness checks, our data does not allow us to further investigate the potential
impact of contextual factors on the relationship between institutional attributes and public supportmore
systematically. Future research can shed more light on these questions.
16. See also Bechtel and Scheve’s (2013) study on institutional design and climate agreements, and Hahm
et al. (2019) on treaty design and trade attitudes.
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17. In the field of international relations,Kertzer and Zeitzoff (2017) note that this behavioural assumption
about democratic constituents is essential formany domestic political accounts of international relations,
including audience cost theories.
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